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This paper reviews the results of two decades of research on moral approval of aggressive 
acts conducted in several countries with different religious and cultural backgrounds. A 
nationally-adapted version of the Lagerspetz and Westman questionnaire was administered 
to university students in Finland, Poland, Spain, Japan, Iran and India. Respondents had to 
indicate levels of justification of several aggressive acts of different quality and intensity in 
the context of different social justifications. Although slight method variations preclude the 
possibility of direct comparison, the pattern of effects in the different countries leads to 
interesting conclusions. In all countries: more drastic forms of aggression (e.g., killing, 
torture) are less accepted than non-dangerous forms of such behavior (e.g., hindering,  
being ironic); and aggressive acts that are socially justified (in terms of protection of self or 
other) are clearly more accepted than ones with no such justification (problems of 
communication). However, there are also some striking differences among the samples 
studied. Thus, patterns of moral approval of various kinds of aggressive acts are only to 
some extent common to most cultures, while there are some culturally bound differences in 
these attitudes.  
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 Problems of aggression and violence are one of the largest categories of 
childhood disorders, and plague people’s interpersonal, inter-group, and social 
interactions. This explains the interest that a broad range of disciplines, included 
developmental psychology, invest in understanding why, which and when 
individuals engage in different kinds of aggression.   
 
Our present research on aggression leads to two main purposes: First, to 
uncover theoretical and causal relations among conceptual variables, enriching our 
understanding of aggression (its models are likely to have more explanatory power 
if they articulate the ways personality should be associated with aggression). As a 
second objective, a finer discrimination in its conceptualization could also 
contribute to refine preventive, therapeutic, and policy interventions aimed at 
reducing aggression.  
 
Even though non-experimental data, such as the self-reports here reviewed, 
cannot be used to probe any causal relation, the present review tries to provide 
strong evidence that an interaction of both biological traits and psychosocial 
environments impact the likelihood of aggression: physiological explanations 
require psychosocial counterparts, and vice versa (Anderson, 1997; Ramirez, 
2000; Wann et al. 2003).  Even if we cannot currently provide definitive answers, 
we may help to point towards giving more heed to this problem (Barrat & Felthous, 
2003).  
 
In a series of previous papers (Ramirez, 1986a, 1991,1993, 2001) I have 
argued that how and to what extent a person justifies aggression depends on a 
wide variety of factors, including personality, aspects of lifestyle, such as choice of 
profession or attitude toward life or the Weltanschaaung, and prevailing norms in 
our own culture. Socio-normative attitudes towards aggression thus influence both: 
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1) socialization of aggression in the course of individual development, and 2) 
dynamics of violence in everyday social life (Bonino & Fraçzek, 1996).  
 
This essay reviews and compares the patterns of moral approval of 
aggressive acts in different circumstances revealed in previous studies conducted 
with different national samples. Although there are already many studies that make 
comparisons among a small (usually two) number of nations, our purpose is to 
offer a broader comparison in the hope that a more global approach can reveal 
even deeper insights about similarities and differences across different national 
groups. We expected similar, but not identical features in the overall degree of 
justification of aggression in the different populations, with some minor gender and 
cultural differences. To a certain extent their justification would correspond to rules 
based on common sense: mild acts, such as verbal aggression, would be more 
acceptable than stronger ones involving physical aggression; gross provocation 
would permit greater approval than unprovoked aggression; and people would be 
more likely to approve acts motivated by altruism than those by selfishness. 
 
 There is good reason to assume that societies have some moral rules which 
suggest that different forms of aggression become acceptable under particular 
circumstances. Are these codes unique to each society? Or, on the contrary, is 
there a certain universality of norms and beliefs common to all human beings? 
Although the influence of the psychosocial environment on behavior cannot be 
disentangled from the biological one, cross-cultural studies can help us understand 
which biosocial processes are involved in aggression. One way of understanding 
human aggression therefore is viewing it from a cross-cultural perspective (Segall, 
1988). Such a comparison may lead to interesting conclusions, allowing us to 
consider the extent to which beliefs about the morality of particular aggressive acts 
might be universal, embedded in our biology, or vary by culture as well as by 
specific circumstances.  
I started asking students from four different Spanish regions how they would 
accept several categories of aggressive acts of different levels of intensity and 
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quality in different types of justifying situations. Only minor differences among them 
were reported (Ramirez, 1986a, 1993). Later the same questionnaire was applied 
to students from other European countries (Poland and Finland), investigating not 
only whether the situation affected a person's attitude towards aggression but also 
whether one's culture and environment had a significant effect on the acceptance 
of aggressive acts. The degree of acceptance of interpersonal aggression was also 
very similar in all the populations studied (Ramirez, 1991).  
This consistency in moral judgments by people of such different societies 
would suggest the existence of a certain universal moral code common to all 
human beings. All the countries studied however were European and, although 
each had its own culture, language, and customs, they shared to some extent a 
common Christian background. Before making a more valid general statement 
applicable to all the humanity it would be advisable to make further comparisons 
with other cultures with quite different cultural and religious backgrounds. 
For this purpose, our cross-cultural studies followed two different strategies. 
The first was to analyze justifications of aggression in several Oriental societies 
with different cultures and religious backgrounds: Japan (with a Xintoist 
background), India (predominantly Hindu), Iran (Shiite Muslims), Bangladesh 
(Sunni Muslims), Philippines (predominantly Christian), and China, with a mix of 
Buddhism and Marxist atheism1. The second strategy was to compare justifications 
of aggression in countries with different cultures living within the same society, 
such as South Africa (Theron et al, 2001; Delapuente, 2006) and Canada (Ramirez 
et al., 2005), where multiculturalism has become a basic value. 
 
The moral justification of several aggressive acts of different quality and 
intensity was analyzed in the context of different social circumstances. 
Undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 212 assessed their personal 
degree of approval of aggression during particular circumstances. All were natives 
                                                 
1 Here we present the results of three countries: Iran, Japan, and India; research in other Asian cultures is still 
in progress. 
2 Data from adolescents are not included. 
 5
of their country and had grown up in an urban environment3. Although data were 
collected from both sexes, here only the average overall data are analyzed. 
 
A questionnaire originally constructed by Lagerspetz and Westman (1980) 
and subsequently revised by Ramirez (1986a) was applied. Since the degree of 
approval would depend on the qualities of the behavior observed, its items 
describe different types of aggressive acts in combination with diverse situations in 
which they may be conducted. The eight categories of aggressive acts are: hitting, 
killing, shouting angrily, being ironic, using torture, having a fit of rage, threatening 
or hindering another person from doing something. Each category of acts is 
accompanied by a list of six different circumstances in which the aggressive 
behavior may be justified, namely: in self-defense, in protecting another person, as 
a consequence of emotional agitation, in defense of one’s property, as a 
punishment, or as a way of overcoming communication difficulties. No examples of 
the behaviors or extra information are given; the particular meanings of each of the 
categories are left to the respondents. The response scale for the questionnaire 
varied from one to another version: a two-point scale (acceptable vs. not 
acceptable), a three-point scale (always, sometimes, never), and a four-point scale 
(usually, in some cases, in extreme cases, never)4. 
 
The following tables summarize the ranking of the justification of acts and 
situations5 in the different samples (see Tables 1, 2), giving us an idea of to which 
extent it shows consistency across cultures or varies by culture and by situation.  
(INSERT TABLE I) 
 
With regard to specific acts: 
                                                 
3 We selected only urban residents to minimize the effect of other cultural variables (e.g., urban vs. rural). 
4 The questionnaire has already been used in Finland (Lagerspetz and Westman, 1980; Lagerspetz et al., 1988), Britain 
(Benton, Kumari, and Brain, 1982), Poland (Fraçzek, 1985; Fraczek, Ramirez, and Torchalska, 1987), Spain (Ramirez, 
1986a; 1991; 1993), Japan and the U.S.A. (Ramirez and Fujihara, 1997; Fujihara, Kohyama, Andreu and Ramirez, 
1999), Iran (Musazadeh, 1999), India (Sunni, 2005), and South Africa. Its application in other Asian countries 
(Bangladesh, China, and Philippines) is still in progress. 
5 Act-situation interactions are not included 
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a) It is not surprising to discover that in all populations mildly aggressive acts 
were more acceptable than stronger and more drastic acts (e.g., striking or 
shouting met with more approval than killing). 
b) Being ironic was the most justified act, as an average, except in Finland, 
where it was unexpectedly ranked 5th among six. 
c) Verbal aggression (shouting, being ironic, rage) was considered more 
acceptable than physically aggressive acts in all cultures; the three different 
kinds of verbal aggression had a similar degree of approval. 
d) Passive aggression (hindering) was the largest accepted act in the 
European average and in Iran, but rated only the 4th in India and Japan.  
e) Threat received an higher approval than physical aggression and lower than 
verbal aggression; it is interesting to point out, though,  that it was one of the 
most highly justified acts in Poland (1st) and in Finland (2nd), whereas it 
ranked the 5th in Spain and in the Asian samples. 
f) Physical aggression (hitting, killing, torture) was the least justified in all 
samples; hitting was always more approved than killing and torturing, with 
no significant differences between these last two. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 2) 
With regard to situations:  
a) Gross provocation led to more approval of retaliation than unprovoked 
aggression (e.g., killing was considered more justified for altruistic reasons 
than as a mere expression of bad temper). 
b) Socially justified aggressive acts, such as those conducted in protection of 
self or other, were clearly more accepted than ones with no such justification 
(e.g. as an expression of emotions, as a result of communication 
difficulties); 
c) Defensive situations -of self, property, or another person- were generally 
seen as more morally justified; within them, defending others and self 
defense received more moral approval than defending property did. Two 
intriguing exceptions were the Iranian sample, in which defending others 
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was only the 5th among six, and the Indian sample, with defense of property 
also ranking the 5th. 
d) Punishment and emotional reaction had very low level of justification among 
Europeans, the 5th among six in all of them; but Iranians rated punishment 
as the most justified situation. 
e) Communication problems as circumstances for aggression action were seen 
as the least justified, especially among Asians and Spaniards, for whom this 
situation was absolutely unjustifiable.   
 
A comparison of the results shows a high consistency in the level of 
approval of interpersonal aggression in all of the samples studied. For instance, 
certain acts were never justified, regardless of cultural context, and serious 
aggression was always less accepted than mild aggression (Wann et al., 2003). 
There were similar trends among people of such contrasting cultures, 
corresponding to basic rules of “common sense.”  
 
These overall similarities in moral approval for aggression by people of such 
different societies suggest a sharing of similar standards of approval, as if there 
were some common moral code ruling their justification.  Depending upon the 
situation, some behaviors appear to be considered admissible by most people. In a 
favorable atmosphere, for instance, people engage in aggression more frequently 
and with greater intensity than in situations in which there is a predominance of 
common disapproval (Ramirez, 1996). The moderating role of norms explains the 
fact that when no norms were present, subjects tend to use the highest levels of 
coercion. These normative beliefs would also moderate the escalation of 
aggression, justifying and instigating a proportionate retaliation to unjustified norm-
violations (see also: Lee & Tedeschi, 1996). Social rules, disapproving a behavior, 
might inhibit whatever aggression is supposed to be shown (Berkowitz, 1989); and 
the violation of a norm can foster justification or approval of aggressive retaliation.  
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The unsolved but unavoidable question would be whether the moderating 
role of moral norms common to most human beings (and perhaps universal) might 
be explained in terms of a common ‘natural law’ basis, in terms of biological roots 
common to the human species, or even partially shared with other animal species. 
Human beings are not alone in their ability to use tools, to communicate in 
sophisticated ways, to have a conception of mind, and to manipulate others 
through aggression or reconciliation. Homo sapiens may not be the only species to 
construct a moral order. Empathy, sympathy, cooperation, a sense of justice, and 
moral systems are not unique to human beings; we share them with other animal 
species (Ramirez, 1986b).  
 
Empathy (the feeling of what another is feeling) is also shown in 
chimpanzees. Cooperation is common to many animals; they know one another 
well enough to synchronize their behavior, and they can predict the outcome of a 
common effort. Wolves regularly coordinate their hunts and then share the meal; 
vampire bats share blood by regurgitating it for their offspring; ants, termites and 
bees are social insects; dolphins and whales quickly close ranks when faced with 
danger and protect the ones they know best or beach themselves rather than 
abandon a sick mate; elephants prop up a sick relative and keep a vigil until death 
is obvious and fondle the bones of their dead.  
 
Moral systems grow not from some lofty sense of equality and 
righteousness but from the simple need to get along; they are rules to deal with 
internal competition in a group. What motivates animals to do right or wrong are 
the necessities and burdens of social living, a constraint we all share; for example, 
when resources are in short supply, fights break out. Primates combine high 
intelligence with intense social interaction, forming long-lasting friendships with 
non-relatives maintained in a tit-for-tat manner. The cognitive basis for morality can 
be found in the behavior of other animals, which suggests a long evolutionary 
history for the human approach to social life. Our moral rules must be viewed as 
part of our biological -that is, evolutionary- heritage, something that connects us 
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with other animals. The forces of natural selection have molded all animals. If 
morality is a product of natural selection, an unavoidable outcome of social living, 
then there is nothing so special about our particular brand of right and wrong (De 
Waal, 1996). Like people, other animals are organized into networks of rank and 
status, in which members apply force or respond to coercion; they also make 
calculated decisions about whom to intimidate and whom to harm. There is a deep 
connection between people and apes in aggression and violence (Ramirez, 2000). 
 
These biological roots of morality, however, do not preclude the influence of 
culture on judgments about aggression. Certain cultural differences emerge. 
Prevailing cultural norms and role expectations in any given society influence what 
is judged to be healthy self-assertion. Each society has a code, written or not, 
about acceptance or justification of different forms of aggression in different 
specific circumstances. This may explain some striking differences among the 
countries studied both in relation to seriousness, as well as to the kind of 
justification of manifested aggression:  
a) Irony, which was considered a quite serious offense in Finland, was one of 
the less harmful behavior in the rest of the samples. This rather 'odd' finding 
may be due to problems of translation: the Finnish word for ‘irony,’ is not as 
mild as the English word; it would perhaps be better translated as mockery, 
ridicule, or derision. 
b) Justification of aggressive behavior as a means of punishment had very low 
acceptance in Europe, but relatively high approval in Asia, being even the 
most justified situation in Iran. A possible explanation, beside eventual 
problems of translation, is that in Muslim countries punishment is seen as a 
correct way of treating somebody who has inflicted injury in others. 
c) The level of approval of rage was high in all countries except Finland and 
Poland. This is consistent with the training of Nordic children, who are 
expected to express themselves in ‘a more reasonable way,’ instead of in a 
rather juvenile, emotional way  (e.g., Nordic parents often share decision-
making about family issues with their children). These children thus learn 
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that the expression of emotion and anger is a consequence of a lack of 
skills. 
d) Nordic European countries and Japan justified emotionality less than Iran, 
India and Spain. This may be partially explained by the typical 'emotional' 
warmness of 'Mediterranean' countries, among which, sociologically 
speaking, these three cultures might be included. This typically feminine 
stereotype (females approve more of emotional reasons) also agrees with 
the low masculinity score found in Spaniards by Hofstede (1991) and by 
Fujihara et al. (1999). 
e) The unexpected low justification of defense of others in Iran, and of defense 
of property in the Indian sample, ranking only the 5th among six in both 
cases, could be partially explain by following arguments: 
1. Defense of others may not be high in the Iran rank as it may be 
misinterpreted and then yourself would be subject to corporal 
punishment; an illustrative anecdote in this context is that, if you run over 
somebody, you are liable for the death penalty unless you make financial 
redress to the family of the person killed; this means that a third part 
would not intervene in any dispute.  
2. Defense of property in India does not figure high in the rank due to their 
conceptions of the self (as an expression of consciousness) and of 
karma (action/reaction); one would not want to incur reactive karma for 
something that is impermanent, such as is possession of property. 
 
According to Bandura's social learning theory (1971), predominant attitudes in 
a society would be an important factor in the expression of aggression: violent acts 
would be more frequent and intense in a favorable environment than when there is 
a social disapproval. Although there are cases of violence that clearly cannot be 
tolerated in any civilized society, such as murder and torture, other behaviors may 
be labeled as dangerous or socially unacceptable merely because they are 
offensive to group sensibilities or because they challenge or upset an immoral or 
unjust status quo. Judgments of aggressiveness reflect the values and interests of 
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those doing the judging. People prevented from reaching a desired goal may 
become aggressive when the interference is thought illegitimate or arbitrary. Even 
justified, reasonable, and legitimate frustrations ¨for which excusable reasons exist¨ 
can activate an instigation to aggression (Dollard et al. 1939; Berkowitz, 1989). 
Another example may be its high justification in cases of a personal attack, such as 
self-defense and defense of others, shown in the present research.  
Certain situations elicit different behaviors depending upon the characteristics 
of the person confronted as well as the nature of the particular situation. According 
to the Ajzen´s theory of planned behavior (1991), broad fundamental life values 
can influence behavior indirectly through their impact on beliefs and attitudes; and 
following his previous theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), personal 
attitudes act as mediating variables influencing behavior to the extent that they 
influence intentions to engage in that behavior (Schreurs et al., 2005). We should 
not dismiss that culture has a significant effect on the acceptance of aggressive 
acts. It influences changing attitudes toward aggression, even if some attitudes will 
not change. 
Some differences in culture may be linked to differences in the way the self is 
construed as well as in societal regulations. Markus and Kitayama (1991) pointed 
out that there are strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the 
independence of the different construals in different cultures; and that they have a 
set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion and motivation. Asian cultures, 
such as Japan, have an interdependent construal of the self, they are socially 
oriented, and they are concerned with fitting in, belonging, promoting other's goals 
and being indirect. On the contrary, Europeans typically have an independent view 
of the self and seek independence from others. Although they did not examine the 
consequences of such differences on aggression, these differences are expected 
to affect aggression too: Japanese may be more repressed compared to 
Westerners. Further, since the laws concerned with activities related to aggression 
differ in both countries (e.g., having guns is illegal in Japan but legal in America). 
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These differences may also be linked to different degree of justification of 
interpersonal aggression. 
Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance dimension would lead to a different 
prediction. According to him (Hofstede, 1991), in high uncertainty avoidance 
cultures, aggressive behavior of the self and others is acceptable; however, 
individuals prefer to contain aggression by avoiding conflict and competition 
(Gudykunst & Antonio, 1993). He also points out that Japan and Spain are high in 
uncertainty avoidance, while Nordic countries have a low avoidance culture. 
 
Moreover, children and youngsters who are judged to be excessively 
aggressive, in the core sense of causing or threatening physical injury, often come 
from poor and fragmented communities and belong to minority groups that have 
suffered from discrimination and negative social stereotyping. Sometimes, this may 
be more reflective of social stereotyping than an objective assessment of the 
individual child's conduct and propensities.  
 
 I acknowledge that the results of our analysis are limited in a number of 
ways. The most important limitation perhaps is that differences across age groups 
are not the focus of this study, although we have used samples of a large range of 
ages. We are aware of the importance of studies in childhood from a 
developmental approach. Characteristics found in childhood may extend into 
adolescence and adulthood (Coie et al., 1990), Also, most potential lectors of this 
journal are dedicated to developmental psychology. Space limitations precluded 
the inclusion of developmental approaches in this paper. Clearly, we need morel 
research to clarify the role of age in the development of attitudes towards 
aggression. The cross-sectional nature of the present study prevents any 
conclusion that supports the assumption that developmental changes in processing 
information about aggression leads to a decline of its use in direct and physical 
aggression. As children grow older and mature, they evaluate it more negatively 
and their justification of aggression becomes lower.  
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There is a caveat related to the ‘generalizability’ of the present results. As in 
most other research, the participants were undergraduate students. Overt 
expressions of anger are clearly not something observed very often in normal 
university students; they score low on questionnaires dealing with the frequency of 
overt aggression and angry and aggressive dispositions. Generalizing to other less 
educated populations may pose problems. Future studies need to be replicated in 
other ages, educational levels, and professional backgrounds, because 
subpopulations defined in terms other than geography may also have different 
codes for the acceptance of aggression.  
 
A study done in Finland (Lagerspetz et al., 1988) with adults of several 
professional backgrounds showed that different groups of people within the same 
country had differing attitudes toward aggression. Soldiers held higher justifications 
of aggression. Conscientious objectors had more negative attitudes toward 
aggression. The conscientious objectors had lower total approval scores, and 
especially for items related to defense, killing, and torturing. Similarly, Bonino and 
Fraçzek (1996) found that approval of antisocial behavior was greater among 
adolescents from big cities than among those from rural areas (this was one of the 
reasons we limited our study to respondents from urban environments.) 
 
Another limitation of the present essay is that the studies on which these 
comparisons were made are not fully comparable from a methodological point of 
view. We have different samples, different times of collecting data, different 
number of alternatives, unavailable original raw data, etc. Also there may be 
significant distortion due to difficulties with translation. Some of the 'odd' or 
unexpected results found in the present comparison may be explained in terms of 
the different meanings of a term applied in each language. Finding words that 
correspond well in all languages is one persistent dilemma in all cross-cultural 
research that depends on verbal measures.  
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The utilization of self-reports has often been criticized because they are 
likely to be influenced by social desirability: actual behavior needs not conform to 
ideal models of conduct (Cohen, 1955). Subjects may give only desirable answers 
to the hypothetical situations described to them (Berkowitz, 1989). We must clarify 
that our present research with the CAMA does not focus on absolute levels of 
aggressive behavior, but only on the relationship between the different samples. 
Also, high self-awareness magnifies the correlates between self-reports and 
behavior (Scheier et al, 1974; Turner et al., 1975). A meta-analysis done by 
Bettencourt et al. (2006) has found a positive correlation between aggression, 
measured by self-reports and personality dimensions. This assures the usefulness 
of these instruments in the early identification of individuals with a personality 
prone to aggression and, consequently, in facilitating appropriate treatment 
(Stanford et al., 1995). 
 
Finally, another important question for future research is to analyze the 
attitude toward different kinds of aggression. For instance, Wann and colleagues 
(1998) observed a higher willingness of instrumental aggression than of hostile 
aggression. it will be quite appropriate therefore to develop instruments that 
distinguish between them. In this direction, we have recently done a new version of 
CAMA that distinguishes between hostile-reactive and instrumental-proactive 
dichotomies of aggression (Ramirez & Andreu, 2006; Andreu, Ramirez, & Raine, 
2006). 
 
In conclusion, a comparison of results from the six countries shows similar 
but not identical levels of justification of aggressive acts in different situations with 
some minor cultural differences. In all populations: a) mild aggressive acts were 
more acceptable than serious aggression; b) provoked aggression was approved 
more than unprovoked aggression; and c) people of all cultures were more likely to 
approve acts motivated by altruism than by selfishness. These overall results 
suggest a certain universal moral code, common to all humanity, although with 
minor differences according to sex, culture, education, and professional 
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background. Civilizations so far away among them as Centro American Mayas, 
and Asian Iraq, India, China share similar beliefs, practices, and signals, and the 
deep common patterns in human development. Aggressiveness is a deeply rooted 
attitude that overpasses cultural or national borders (Ramírez, 1991; Ramírez & 
Fujihara, 1997). Thus it can be concluded that: 1) the moral code (average over all 
combinations of situations and acts of aggression) does not favor aggressive 
behavior as a means of resolving conflicts, except in 'extreme cases' (Ramirez, 
2000); and 2) patterns of moral approval of aggressive acts are only partially 
common in the contemporary world. Different attitudes among countries and 
professions are culturally bounded. What we have in common, principles and 
values that unify us -the common roots of humanity- seems more important than 
what divides us. As Bernard Russell and Albert Einstein wrote exactly half a 
century ago, in their 1957 Manifesto, we should “Remember our Humanity!”  
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Table 1: Rank of Approval for Aggressive Acts 
in Urban Students from Several European and Asian Countries 
 
COUNTRY 
Finland Poland Spain EURO Iran Japa
n 
India ASIA 
TOTAL 
year 1980 1985 1999  1999 1999 2005   
N 83 64 210  492 242 145   
rank 
   averag
e 
   
average average 
1st hd th ir hd hd ra ra ra ir = 
2,33 
2nd th ir ra ir ir ir ir ir hd= 
2,67 
3rd ht hd hd th ra sh sh hd ra = 
3,00 
4th sh sh sh sh sh hd hd 
sh 
sh 
=3,67 
5th ir ra th 
ra 
th th th th th = 
3,83 
6th ra ht ht ht ht ki ht 
ht 
ht = 
4,33 
7th ki to ki ki to ht to to ki = 
7,33 
8th to ki to to ki to ki ki to = 
7,50 
hd = hindering; ir =being ironic; sh = shouting; ra = rage; th = threatening; ht = hitting; ki = killing; to = 
torturing 
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Table 2: Rank of Approval for Justifying Situations 
in Urban Students from Several European and Asian Countries 
 
COUNTRY 
Finland Poland Spain EUROPE Iran Japan India ASIA 
TOTAL   
year 1980 1985 1999  1999 1999 2005     
N 83 64 210  492 242 145     
rank     average    average average   
1st DO DO DO SD PU SD SD SD SD = 1,50   
2nd SD SD SD DO DP DO DO DO DO = 2,00 
  
3rd DP DP DP DP SD DP PU PU DP = 3,17 
  
4th NC NC EM EM EM PU EM DP PU = 3,83 
  
5th PU PU PU NC DO EM DP EM EM = 4,83 
  
6th EM EM NC PU NC NC NC NC NC = 7,67 
  
DO = defense of others; SD = self defense; DP =defense of property; PU = punishment; EM = emotional 
reaction; NC = problems of communication 
 
 
 
 
 
